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ABSTRACT
A major portion (73%) of the life cycle 
cost of the Space Shuttle is related to 
operations; this paper presents 
recommendations for reducing that cost. 
Operational cost drivers at the launch 
site are identified, based on an 
examination of Shuttle operational data 
collected over the past two and one 
half years.
For decades, the launch vehicles of the 
Free World have been designed for 
performance, with very little attention 
given to consideration for support 
and/or maintainability. Examples are: 
multiple commodities; toxic materials; 
complexity; ordnance; 
inaccessibility; unique systems or 
components (lack of commonality and 
multiple function); Flight hardware 
designs drive Launch Site resources 
for: test operations to demonstrate 
hardware/software conformance to design 
parameters; test personnel—numbers 
and skill mix; ground support 
equipment; facilities; assembly; and 
maintenance. A case is made for 
incorporating support and 
maintainability criteria in the design 
process.
INTRODUCTION
Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of space 
vehicle systems have been significantly 
influenced by inordinately excessive 
operations costs, due to the fact that 
for decades, vehicles have been designed 
primarily (if not exclusively) for 
performance, with practically no 
attention given to operability. The 
current practice is to perform
operability analyses outside the design 
process, and usually "after the fact", 
with little or no input to major design 
decisions. As a result, after the 
hardware is shipped to the launch site, 
the onus is on the personnel there to 
"make it work". Fortunately, launch 
site personnel have been very successful 
in "making it work", but the recurring 
cost of operations has been excessive.
Boeing Aerospace Operations has 
conducted a two-and-one-half year study 
known as "Shuttle Ground Operations 
Efficiencies/Technologies Study" for the 
Kennedy Space Center, using the Space 
Shuttle Program as a source of data. 
(Final report of the entire study is 
available from the authors, as well as 
the library of each of the NASA 
centers.) Operational cost drivers were 
identified and recommendations were made 
to eliminate or reduce those items. The 
results of the study indicated that 
although it may be too late to 
"significantly" change the Shuttle 
system per se, development of launch 
site criteria for use by the various 
design agencies would be beneficial for 
future programs. The study began with 
an exhaustive examination of the 
prelaunch and postlanding process and 
provides, for the first time, a 
published set of launch site data 
prepared to a level of detail 
sufficiently rigorous and credible for 
acceptance and use by design 
organizations. Although it was a 
generally accepted premise that the 
Shuttle system is not as efficient as 
predicted, the actual figures are quite 
startling. The system costs more than
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promised, it is not as productive, and 
it costs more to fly (e.g. cost per 
pound of payload in orbit is ten times 
the projected cost) (see figure !.)• A 
significant contributor to the 
greater-than-projected cost is the fact 
that the launch processing time is more 
than ten times the original design goal 
of 160 hours (see figure 2.). 
Furthermore, due to safety requirements 
imposed as a result of the Challenger 
accident, the processing time is 
becoming longer, rather than shorter.
The next major space vehicle on the 
horizon is- the Advanced Launch System 
(ALS). The ALS Program has a stated 
goal of reducing the cost of launching 
payloads by an order of magnitude. It 
is a formidable goal, and will require a 
new way of doing business—starting with 
the preparation of the requirements (as 
defined in the Request for Proposals) to 
the design of the vehicle, to 
manufacture of the hardware, to the
activities at the launch site, as veil 
as a new philosophy in the management of 
the Program.
The design of flight hardware 
drives launch site resources 
(facilities, consumables, and personnel) 
for: test operations to demonstrate 
hardware/software conformance to design 
parameters; test sequences and 
schedules; hardware configuration 
control practices; test personnel - 
numbers and skill mix; GSE (Ground 
Support Equipment); and facilities. 
The first action that must be taken to 
assure the incorporation of launch 
operation criteria in the design process 
is a change in mind-set: designers of 
future vehicles, beginning with the 
design concept phase, must put life 
cycle costs ahead of performance. We 
are hauling cargo via a freighter—not 
participating in a yacht race for the 
America's Cup! The place to start is in 
the preparation of the RFP (Request For
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Government procurement must utilize 
a contracting mode that establishes 
prime contractors with sufficient 
authority for system integration to 
define not only the operational 
requirements for the system, but the 
detailed, specific configuration 
requirements as well, including hardware 
and software. This will enable 
cost-effective management for the total 
system architecture, including hardware 
acceptance and sub-contractor control. 
Contracts that specify GFE (Government 
Furnished Equipment), such as engines, 
and dictate detailed specifications 
rather than the performance of the 
product severely limit a prime 
contractor's ability to achieve the 
optimum design, or manage the job in a 
cost effective manner. Most detail 
hardware specifications limit the 
contractor's capability to be innovative 
and cost effective. The list of 
applicable specifications in an RFP is 
usually based on "What did we do last 
time?". Many requirements are 
substantially arbitrary, and 
conservative requirements never get 
reevaluated and go away.
Major recurring operational cost 
drivers are instigated by decisions made 
in the design process. There often are 
design Solutions that will substantially 
reduce those operational costs and thus 
reduce life cycle cost. They can be 
found in all elements of the vehicle: 
avionics and software, power, structures 
and materials, propulsion, as well as 
facilities and support equipment. A 
simple, robust propulsion system, for 
instance, is a prime candidate. Some 
suggested solutions are:
1) An integrated system, that within 
itself, provides the essential 
elements of main propulsion, orbit 
insertion, and attitude control. 
Such an integration would radically 
reduce the supporting operations and 
maintenance.
2) Provide Thrust Vector Control or a 
form of vehicle attitude control by a 
means other than gimballed engines. 
The vehicle and ground operations 
will be simplified by the deletion of
gimballed engines and the associated 
systems. Most gimbal actuators are 
driven by hydraulic systems, which 
are inherently complex and plagued 
with Operation and Maintenance (O&M) 
and GSE activities. They require 
extensive check-out, are subject to 
leakage, and require a "standing 
army" of engineers and technical 
specialists. If gimballing cannot be 
eliminated, use an alternate 
actuation system such as 
electro-mechanical devices.
3) A vehicle design that uses only 
one set of commodities (oxidizer and 
fuel), will simplify propellant 
procurement, transport, storage, 
pumping, safety equipment, etc. The 
Shuttle has five propellant 
components. Each of the associated 
ground systems requires its own 
operational procedures; its little 
army of engineers, technicians, 
safety personnel, expensive, 
hazardous facilities, and specialized 
GSE.
4) Avoid the use of hypergols for 
propulsion or APU (Auxiliary Power 
Unit) systems. A very significant 
quantity of non-productive manhours 
is consumed during each Shuttle 
launch processing flow for "area 
clear" during hazardous "opening", 
entry, or operation of these systems. 
There is also a snowball effect on 
facilities and O&M requirements for 
special ventilation, scrubbers and < 
multitude of safety equipment, 
including a small army specially 
trained to do its job in SCAPE 
(Self-Contained Atmospheric 
Protective Ensemble) suits.
Another significant conclusion in 
the study was that the increased 
application of automation to evaluate 
systems and conduct operations will 
provide several means for reducing 
launch operations costs and will provide 
benefits such as:
(1) Increase the speed of the total 
checkout (reduce time -in-flow 
requirements).
(2) Reduce manpower requirements
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(3) Reduce the possibility of human 
error.
(4) Minimize documentation changes 
(test-to-test consistency) and 
increase the potential for reducing 
the time required for manual tasks as 
a result of the "learning curve" 
process
The area that will benefit most 
from the incorporation of additional 
automation techniques is "Test and 
Checkout". Improvements that should be 
provided in that area include:
(1) 100% Computer Connectivity. All 
computers associated in any manner 
with operations, flight or ground, 
must maintain complete connectivity 
(bridging). The large amount of data 
required to support and maintain an 
operational system requires 
efficiency in its acquisition, 
processing, and use. Paperwork, 
including its development, 
maintenance, use, and control, 
currently consumes a large portion of 
the operations budget. A significant 
reduction in Life Cycle Cost can be 
achieved by intensive application and 
use of automation to reduce the 
amount of paperwork required to 
process the vehicle.
(2) Automated Electronics. 
Operational and support procedures 
should be based and maintained on 
computers. Automation of the OMI 
(Operations and Maintenance 
Instructions) process, including 
development, maintenance, and use of 
OMIs, provides improvements in costs, 
discipline of usage, verification of 
performance data, and compliance with 
configuration changes.
(3) Automatic Verification of Test 
Requirements. An automated testing 
system would verify and document the 
satisfaction of approved test 
requirements and would automatically 
correlate the verification with the 
completion of the associated 
procedures. & truly paperless, 
automated OMI would control the 
sequence execution and scheduling 
systems 'that track the completion of 
each procedure and task. As each 
task is completed without error, or
after maintenance and retest is 
accomplished, all associated test 
requirements would be automatically 
verified.
(4) Multiflow Redundant Avionics 
Suite (MFRAS)7To support mandated 
system availability, avionics systems 
must provide for higher reliability 
by providing several levels of fault 
tolerance through redundancy. Future 
systems could be designed such that 
they can be dynamically configured to 
provide for more than one function. 
Should an allocated processor or 
subsystem fail, another processor 
with a lesser priority function would 
be assigned to reconfigure and 
perform the function of the failed 
processor.
(5) Returned Vehicle Self-test for 
Reflight. After flight, the returned 
vehicle should have sufficient 
self-test capability to verify its 
readiness for the next flight or 
provide problem isolation down to the 
LRU (Line Replaceable Unit) level. 
During flight, BIT identifies and 
records anomalies. After landing, 
BIT/BITE isolates the problem to the 
LRU level. After replacement of the 
faulty component(s), BIT retests the 
system and verifies flight readiness.
(6) Autonomous Guidance Navigation 
and Control (GN&C). Onboard BIT/BITE 
of GN&C can eliminate, simplify or 
reduce the requirements for ground 
support operations. The use of 
computerized electronics similar to 
that in the Boeing 757/767 or 
advanced military aircraft would 
provide self-test and fault isolation 
to the LRU level of system elements. 
The design should include the concern 
for easy accessibility of components 
and should provide the capability to 
replace circuit boards without system 
shutdown.
(7) Software Commonality. The 
vehicle should utilize the same set 
of software for ground operation 
test, integration, and flight 
operations. Current Shuttle ground 
operations are accomplished with 
several different programs, depending
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on the stage of testing. 
Consequently, manhours are consumed 
reloading the main computer memory. 
For example; it requires 14 hours to 
accomplish the final prelaunch load.
The avionics should be designed as a 
distributed system with one or more 
high speed buses providing 
communication between subsystems as 
required. Each subsystem should be 
capable of autonomous ground 
operations by commanding the system 
to a stand-alone mode. In this mode 
all required external stimuli would 
be sufficiently simulated by the 
subsystem to verify its proper 
operation. This would enable each 
subsystem to be tested independently 
of the operational state of the other 
systems. When all ground testing and 
vehicle integration is complete, each 
subsystem would be commanded to the 
flight mode without additional 
reloading of the flight computers.
The achievement of the stated goal 
of reducing the cost of payload to orbit 
by an order of magnitude will require a 
change in "mind-set" on the part of each 
person on the Project Team. It must 
start at the top with a leader with the 
imagination and fortitude to "buck the 
tide". Albert Enstein wrote: 
"Imagination is more important than 
knowledge, it is a preview of coming 
attractions." James Vebb, the first 
Administrator of NASA was such a leader. 
In the October, 1988 issue of Government 
Executive, Elmer Staats wrote that when 
Vebb was first approached by Vice 
President Johnson and President Kennedy 
about accepting the position of NASA 
Administrator, he demurred on the 
grounds that he was not a scientist or 
engineer. However, after receiving an 
expression of confidence from President 
Kennedy, he accepted. Later he (Vebb) 
wrote: "The key executive must be able 
and willing to adjust his own work and 
the work of those associated with him to 
the needs of the totality. He must be 
able and willing to forego use of his 
position for 'hobby shopping' in accord
with his own interests and his own 
individual judgments about what is most 
important. He must be willing, when 
necessary, to take actions calculated to 
get the total job done and to assume 
responsibility for decisions and 
judgments of others, even when he would 
himself have it otherwise."
Fortunately, opportunity exists 
today to significantly improve the 
process of considering system 
supportability requirements while 
designing a system that meets 
performance criteria. To make the most 
of these opportunities requires two 
major changes in our way of doing 
business:
(1) Change the "mind set" of all of 
us in the space program to make (or 
accept) compromises in performance if 
they contribute to a reduction in 
LCC.
(2) Provide more effort (dollars) up 
front in the early design phase to 
provide for operationally efficient, 
supportable and maintainable, robust 
systems.
The objective should be Design the 
Support along with the rest of the 
sys t em. Eliminate the need to Support 
the Design with large groups of people 
during the recurring prelaunch 
processing, launch operations, vehicle 
recovery, and refurbishment activities.
Sufficient data are available from 
previous programs to help the designers 
solve many of the operational problems. 
Use of that data to effectively reduce 
recurring Operational Costs would 
require that all levels of Program 
management (Government and Industry) put 
in place the organizational mechanisms 
to place Operational Requirements on an 
equal or higher level than Performance 
Requrements in the interest of reducing 
those costs.
THIS IS A CHALLENGE FOR THE ENTIRE 
INDUSTRY FOR THE NEXT GENERATION(S) OF 
SPACE SYSTEMS -- BOOSTERS, UPPER STAGES, 
AND PAYLOADS.
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